

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01 L-01 H-01

INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 ACDA-10 SP-02 /052 W

----- 128271

P R 191730Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 727

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1531

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: MARCH 18 NPG PERMREPS MEETING ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES  
REPORT TO CONGRESS

REF: A. STATE 57131 B. STATE 53928

SUMMARY: AT MARCH 18 MEETING, NPG PERMREPS RECEIVED  
WITH APPRECIATION PRESENTATION BY MR. DONALD COTTER (ATSD/AE) ON  
STATUS OF WORK ON THE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE REPORT TO  
CONGRESS REQUIRED BY THE NUNN AMENDMENT. PERMREPS ENGAGED IN  
EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF RELATION BETWEEN THE REPORT TO CONGRESS  
AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON MBFR. SEVERAL REPS EXPRESSED VIEW  
THAT NATO SHOULD COME TO GRIPS SOON WITH POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN  
THE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR POSSIBLE  
INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR OPTION IN MBFR. COTTER EMPHASIZED  
THAT SINCE THE REPORT WILL BE CLASSIFIED AND WILL NOT CONTAIN  
SPECIFIC NUMBERS IN THE DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS, IT  
SHOULD NOT SERVE TO PREJUDICE NATO'S MBFR NEGOTIATING POSITION.  
COTTER INDICATED THAT US WOULD BE REQUESTING NATO TO CONDUCT THE  
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FURTHER STUDIES RECOMMENDED BY NMAS. PERMREPS DID NOT SPECIFY  
ANY MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SUMMARY CIRCULATED  
TO THE ALLIES AND THE CONTENTS OF COTTER'S BRIEFING. SOME OF  
THEIR GENERAL COMMENTS CONCERNED HANDLING OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF

REPORT, SOME CONCERN ABOUT EMPHASIS ON WIDE-SCALE WP THEATER NUCLEAR ATTACKS, AND INCREASE OF TARGET COVERAGE BY POSEIDON SLBM'S IN PLACE OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. IN RESPONSE TO US OFFER, SYG LUNS SCHEDULED NEXT MEETING OF NPG PERMREPS WITH MR. COTTER FOR MARCH 25, AT WHICH TIME US WOULD PROVIDE TO ALLIES AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS AND PROVIDE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT FURTHER. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BY AMBASSADOR BRUCE EMPHASIZING THE CONTINUING NATURE OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUBJECTS RAISED IN THE NUNN AMENDMENT, MR. DONALD COTTER (ATSD/AE) BRIEFED NPG AMBASSADORS ON THE STATUS OF WORK ON THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REPORT TO CONGRESS. THE BRIEFING WAS WELL RECEIVED. SYG LUNS AND THE PERM REPS ALL EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR MR. COTTER'S PRESENTATION, FOR THE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT WHICH WE CIRCULATED PRIOR TO THE MEETING (REF A), AND FOR THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS THE US HAS CONDUCTED ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. PERMREPS ENGAGED IN LENGTHLY DISCUSSION OF CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBJECTS RAISED IN THE REPORT TO CONGRESS AND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR OPTION IN MBFR. COTTER STATED FROM THE OUTSET THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED OR COMPETENT TO DISCUSS HANDLING OF MBFR. KRAPF (GERMANY) ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF COTTER'S STATEMENT IN THE BRIEFING THAT MBFR CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD NOT QUOTE PREVENT US FROM PROCEEDING WITH NECESSARY RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE WHICH SHOULD HAVE POSITIVE MBFR EFFECTS UNQUOTE. COTTER EXPLAINED THAT SOME MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WHICH COULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECTS WERE LANCE AND POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF IMPROVED NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELL. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SUGGESTED THERE WAS A PARADOX WHICH CONCERNED HIM OF HOW NATO MIGHT PROCEED WITH CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE RAISED IN THE REPORT AND THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR OPTION IN MBFR. HE ASKED HOW NATO SHOULD STRIKE A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO. HE NOTED THAT CSCE WOULD PROBABLY DRAW TO A CONCLUSION THIS SUMMER, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE INCREASED PUBLIC PRESSURE TO  
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MAKE PROGRESS IN MBFR. HE WONDERED WHAT THE US POSITION WAS ON OPTION III. COTTER SAID THE REPORT TO CONGRESS WOULD NOT CONTAIN SPECIFIC NUMBERS, AND THAT DISCUSSION OF ADJUSTMENTS WOULD BE IN GENERAL TERMS. IN ADDITION, THE REPORT WOULD BE CLASSIFIED. THUS, HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO INFORMATION RELEASED THAT SHOULD PROMPT A PUBLIC DEBATE. COTTER SAID THAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM SEEMED AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED AND CONVEYED A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE NOT TO PRESS FOR UNTIMELY ADJUSTMENTS THAT WOULD UNDERMINE OUR MBFR NEGOTIATING POSITION.

3. MENZIES (CANADA) AND HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) ASKED WHAT CONGRESS COULD BE EXPECTED TO DO AFTER SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT, PARTICULARLY

LARLY AS THIS MIGHT BEAR ON MBFR. COTTER EXPLAINED THAT ONCE THE REPORT WAS SUBMITTED, THE TERMS OF THE LAW WOULD HAVE BEEN MET. HE SAID THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE DISCUSSIONS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION IN THE COMMITTEES CONCERNED. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT WE DID NOT KNOW IF CONGRESS WOULD PASS NEW REQUIREMENTS IN SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION.

4. HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN, MC) AGREED THAT LINKAGE BETWEEN MBFR AND SUBJECTS RAISED IN NUNN AMENDMENT WERE DIFFICULT. HE POINTED OUT THAT NO WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN NATO ON A NUCLEAR OPTION IN MBFR BECAUSE THE COUNCIL HAD NOT REQUESTED IT. HE SAID THE NMA'S COULD DO CONSIDERABLE WORK NOW IF THE COUNCIL WANTED IT DONE, BUT THEY WOULD NEED TO KNOW US INTENTIONS IN ORDER TO CARRY WORK FURTHER.

5. BRUCE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF MBFR IS A VERY COMPLEX POLITICAL PROBLEM AND REINFORCED MR. COTTER'S EARLIER STATEMENT THAT THE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS MBFR IN THIS MEETING. HE SAID THE NUNN AMENDMENT REPORT AND MBFR, ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY LINKED, WERE NONETHELESS SEPARATE SUBJECTS WHICH HE HOPED CONGRESS WOULD TREAT IN THAT WAY. HE THOUGHT THESE ISSUES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN CONGRESS, BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT KNOW THE RESULTS FOR A LONG TIME. HE SAID THAT AT THIS STAGE, PERMREPS CAN REGISTER THEIR RECOGNITION OF NEED FOR COMING TO GRIPS WITH THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM, BUT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT TRY TO SOLVE IT IN THE MEETINGS WITH MR. COTTER TODAY OR NEXT WEEK. HE NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR RESOR AND OTHERS FROM VIENNA WOULD BE VISITING BRUSSELS AT THE END OF THE WEEK TO REPORT ON THE  
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH COULD PROVIDE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE SITUATION.

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P R 191730Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

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6. HARTOGH NOTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES IN PARTICULAR HAVE PRESSED FOR STUDY OF OPTION III IN NATO. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS DID NOT IMPLY THAT THEY NECESSARILY WANTED EARLY INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR OPTION INTO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ONLY THAT NATO STUDIES GET UNDERWAY, SINCE THEY COULD TAKE MONTHS.

7. TURNING TO SUBJECTS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REPORT TO CONGRESS, KRAPF NOTED DISCUSSION IN THE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT (REF A) ON SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS. HE SAID THE ALLIES KNEW VERY LITTLE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT, SINCE SACEUR HAD PROVIDED ONLY LIMITED INFORMATION. COTTER POINTED OUT THAT SACEUR HAD REPORTED THAT SHAPE WAS WORKING ON SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING (SEP) AND THAT SACEUR COULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION AS SHAPE'S WBK PROGRESSED. HE SAID THAT US WAS ALSO PROCEEDING WITH WORK ON PLANNING ADDITIONAL SELECTIVE OPTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC FORCES, WHICH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD DISCUSSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN NATO, AND THAT US WAS STUDYING MEANS OF PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION TO NATO ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. HILL-NORTON ASKED IF US PLANNED TO REQUEST NATO TO CONDUCT  
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THE MORE DETAILED STUDIES OF ADJUSTMENTS IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE RECOMMENDED BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. COTTER SAID US WOULD REQUEST FURTHER STUDIES, AND THAT SUCH REQUESTS WERE IN PREPARATION NOW. HE SAID REQUESTS FOR WORK BY SACEUR WOULD BE CHANNLED THROUGH MC. LOGAN (UK) ASKED IF RESULTS OF SUCH STUDIES WOULD GO TO NPG. SYG LUNS SAID THEY WOULD. HILL-NORTON SAID THAT REFERENCES IN THE REPORT TO CONGRESS SHOULD REFER TO WORK DONE BY ALL NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, NOT THAT JUST DONE BY SACEUR.

9. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THAT REFERENCE IN THE SUMMARY OF REPORT TO POSSIBLE GRIM CHOICES AVAILABLE TO NATO IN FACE OF QUOTE A WP NUCLEAR STRIKE OR LOSS OF MAIN PARTS OF EUROPE TO OVERWHELMING CONVENTIONAL ATTACK UNQUOTE SEEMED AT VARIANCE WITH NATO GUIDELINES FOR INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE, HE SAID, CALLED FOR NATO TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEFORE NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE SERIOUSLY ATTRITED. MENZIES SAID HE FOUND SURPRISING THE EMPHASIS IN THE REPORT PLACED ON INITIAL WIDE-SCALE THEATER NUCLEAR ATTACKS BY THE WP, WHICH HE FOUND AT VARIANCE WITH EMPHASIS IN SOME NPG STUDIES. COTTER REPLIED THAT MILITARY PLANNERS TENDED TO LOOK AT CAPABILITIES, AND THAT WP CAPABILITIES PROVIDED THE OPTION FOR SUCH USE.

10. CATALANO, SECONDED BY SVART (DENMARK), THOUGHT THE SUMMARY DID NOT GIVE ENOUGH ATTENTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADJUSTMENTS, AND HOPED THE REPORT TO CONGRESS WOULD PAY ADEQUATE HEED TO THIS FACTOR. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO IMPORTANCE TO ALLIES OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE QRA ROLE. HE HOPED THAT REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE POSTURE DISCUSSED IN THE REPORT WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESULTS OF THE STUDIES CONDUCTED IN NATO.

11. LOGAN EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE REPORT TO CONGRESS WOULD PORTRAY MORE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND ITS NATO ALLIES STUDYING IMPROVEMENTS THAN HE FOUND REFLECTED IN THE SUMMARY. HE ASKED WHAT SORT OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE CONCERNING SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS. COTTER REPLIED THAT NO PUBLIC STATEMENT IS PLANNED, AND THAT CLASSIFIED REPORTS ARE ROUTINELY PROVIDED TO CONGRESS WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. HE OFFERED, HOWEVER, TO FURNISH THE ALLIES WITH TEXT OF UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT HE ISSUED WHEN HE  
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TESTIFIED RECENTLY BEFORE THE MANPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.

12. MENZIES SAID HE HOPED US WOULD KEEP ALLIES INFORMED OF ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ADMINISTRATION AFTER SUBMISSION OF THE REPORT ON APRIL 1 SO THEY COULD AVOID BEING SURPRISED IN PARLIAMENTS AND ELSEWHERE BY PUBLIC PRESS REPORTS, ETC. HE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS ON QUESTION OF PUBLIC RELEASE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

13. MENZIES ASKED IF THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERING MORE NATO TARGETS WITH POSEIDON WARHEADS, AS DISCUSSED BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AT RECENT NPG MEETINGS, WAS ONE OF THE STUDIES DESIRED BY THE US. COTTER REPLIED THAT IT WAS, NOTING THE POSSIBLE INCREASE IN SURVIVABILITY THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR RELEASING MORE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT FOR CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS. LUNS COMMENTED THAT STRIKES FROM SLBMS, PARTICULARLY IN SELECTIVE USE OPTIONS, COULD PROVE MORE ESCALATORY THAN STRIKES BY TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.

14. LUNS CALLED ATTENTION TO EXPERIENCE WITH WP USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN WINTEX-75. HE NOTED THAT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT SOVIETS ARE EQUIPPED FOR LARGE SCALE CHEMICAL WARFARE. HE THOUGHT THAT SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD CONSTITUTE GRAVE ESCALATION, AND THAT NATO OUGHT NOT LET THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT SUCH USE COULD BE REGARDED SIMPLY AS ANOTHER WAY OF WAGING CONVENTIONAL WAR.

15. LUNS CLOSED MEETING BY WARMLY THANKING COTTER FOR HIS PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION. BRUCE SAID US PLANNED TO PROVIDE TO THE ALLIES AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS, AT WHICH TIME MR. COTTER WOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN TO BRUSSELS

FOR FURTHER CONSULATATIONS. LUNS ACCEPTED THE OFFER, AND SCHEDULED  
NEXT NPG PERMREPS MEETING FOR MARCH 25. BRUCE

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO01531  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750398/abbrziwa.tel  
**Line Count:** 275  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** A. STATE 57131 B. STATE 53928  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <07 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MARCH 18 NPG PERMREPS MEETING ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REPORT TO CONGRESS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, NATO, MNUC  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR  
USNMR SHAPE  
USLOSACLANT  
CINCLANT  
MBFR VIENNA

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006